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Contemporary discussions of egalitarian justice have often focused on the  issue  of  expensive   taste.  G.  A.
Cohen  has  recently  abandoned  the  view   that   all   chosen   disadvantages   are   non-compensable,   now
maintaining  that  chosen  expensive  judgmental  tastes  –  those  endorsed  by  valuational  judgment  –   are
compensable as it is unreasonable to expect persons not to develop them. But chosen expensive brute taste  –
the main type of non-compensable expensive taste on the new scheme – cannot be described  in  such  a  way
that there is a normative difference between it and chosen expensive judgmental  taste.  As  there  are  related
problems  with  denying  compensation  for  the  other  kind  of  expensive  taste   that   might   remain   non-
compensable, Cohen’s position on taste appears to be either implausible or  virtually  indistinguishable  from
that of equality of welfare. However, compensation for valuational judgment-based expensive taste might  be
justified on grounds of responsibility.
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I. Introduction
Consider the following scenario:
1. (a) Steve holds £10.
(b) Harry holds £10.
2. (a) Steve’s taste is  such  that  he  would  obtain  1  unit  of  welfare  (hereafter:  unit)  from
consuming a hamburger.
(b) Steve’s taste is such that he would obtain 10 units from consuming a steak.
(c) Harry’s taste is such that he would obtain 10 units from consuming a hamburger.
d) Harry’s taste is such that he would obtain 1 unit from consuming a steak.
e) No change in the tastes of Steve or Harry is now possible.
3. (a) A hamburger now costs £2.
(b) A steak now costs £10.
4. Steve would now prefer to have Harry’s taste.
5. (a) Prior to t (=a point in the past) Steve’s taste was that of Harry’s.
(b) Harry has not deliberately cultivated his taste, nor could he ever have eliminated it.
(c) Steve deliberately cultivated his present taste at t.
Which of these facts is relevant to egalitarian distributive justice? A wealth egalitarian replies  that
1 alone is relevant, and that the existing distribution is perfectly just. A welfare egalitarian begs to
differ: on her account, 2 and 3 also come into play. She views  the  distribution  as  unjust,  on  the
grounds that Steve is only able to secure 10 units with his funds, whereas Harry is  able  to  secure
50 units with his. Steve has expensive taste, in  the  sense  that  he  is  only  able  to  secure  below
average welfare with average income. The welfare egalitarian views Steve’s expensive  taste  as  a
disadvantage that entitles him to compensation.
            In his highly influential article, ‘What is Equality?’, Ronald Dworkin criticized the welfare
egalitarian’s stance on ‘champagne tastes’ as counterintuitive.[1] His favoured theory  of  equality
of resources did not, however, agree with equality of wealth’s stance  that  1  is  the  only  relevant
fact.  Dworkin  suggested  that  4  is  also  relevant,  for  on  his  scheme  those  with   dispreferred
tastes (or ‘cravings’) are entitled to compensation.
Another position was proposed  in  response  to  Dworkin  in  G.  A.  Cohen’s  well-known
paper ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.[2] Cohen urged that  compensation  for  expensive
tastes did not appear counterintuitive where  those  tastes  were  unchosen;  on  the  contrary,  such
compensation was mandated by justice. On this account, which may be referred to  as  equality  of
opportunity for welfare,[3] 1, 2, 3 and 5 all appear to be relevant.
Cohen has recently modified his account, suggesting that some tastes  that  are  chosen  are
nevertheless compensable.[4] The present article argues that  the  position  that  he  now  wants  to
occupy  either  makes  distributive  decisions  on  morally  arbitrary  grounds  or  comes  close   to
collapsing into equality of welfare. Nevertheless, he does highlight a possible source of injustice –
harsh treatment of valuational judgment-based expensive taste  –  which  the  equality  debate  has
thus far overlooked.[5] This points to the  need  for  renewed  focus  on  the  relationship  between
principles of distributive justice and the content of responsibility.
The paper starts in earnest in section II, which clarifies Cohen’s position on  responsibility.
Cohen is now clear that responsibility for possessing one’s taste is not itself important; it is  rather
responsibility for the expense of  one’s  taste  that  matters.  Section  III  introduces  Cohen’s  new
distinction   between   judgmental   and   brute   taste.   Here   Cohen’s   additional   condition   for
compensation for a taste – that it is based upon valuational judgment – is discussed, and  the  most
plausible interpretation of this condition is put forward.  In  sections  IV  and  V  the  difficulty  of
finding  cases  in  which  Cohen  may  reasonably  refuse  compensation   is   demonstrated.   This
difficulty is due to the fact that, on the two available interpretations of Cohen’s account,  the  non-
compensable expensive taste – chosen brute taste – cannot be formulated in such a  way  that  it  is
morally distinguishable from (compensable) chosen judgmental taste.  In  section  VI  one  special
type of case in which Cohen might refuse to provide  compensation  is  described,  and  a  familiar
kind of problem with such a refusal is identified. This puts Cohen’s view  uncomfortably  close  to
equality of welfare. Section VII notes that one might bite the bullet at this  point,  but  only  at  the
cost of facing Dworkin’s expensive  tastes  objection.  It  is  argued  in  section  VIII  that  a  more
promising strategy is to account for valuational judgment by construing  it  as  an  obstacle  to  full
responsibility. We need not assume that valuational judgment is such an obstacle, but only  that  it
might be.
II. Responsibility and Expense
In ‘Expensive  Taste  Rides  Again’,  Cohen  states  that  he  wishes  to  revise  the  following  first
sentence of the ‘flagship statement’ of  his  earlier  essay:  ‘I  distinguish  among  expensive  tastes
according to whether or not their bearer can reasonably be held  responsible  for  them’.[6]  Cohen
now says that this sentence (together with similar statements in ‘Currency’) is  poorly  formulated.
A suitable reformulation would replace ‘them’ with ‘the  fact  that  her  tastes  are  expensive’.  He
adds the following: ‘It is, as I made it abundantly  clear  elsewhere  in  “Currency,”  precisely  that
fact for which the question of responsibility is crucial’.[7]
            Without this clarification the first sentence of the flagship statement is  at  best  ambiguous
and at worst morally implausible. The original formulation may be read as suggesting  that  justice
distinguishes between responsibility and lack of responsibility for the existence of tastes that  now
happen to be expensive. Persons are entitled to compensation if they have what Dworkin calls bad
preference luck, ‘which is their bad luck  in  having  the  preferences  that  they  do  because  these
preferences are expensive’. [8] On this account, the bare fact that Steve chose to generate his  taste
(fact 5) disqualifies his claim for compensation. But suppose that Steve’s taste was  not  expensive
when he cultivated his taste, and that he could not have predicted that it would  become  so  in  the
future. He has been unlucky, not in having the taste that he does, but in that his  taste  has  become
expensive. He has an unchosen  disadvantage  (a  taste  for  an  expensive  food)  which  would  be
overlooked  by  one  concerned  only  with  bad  preference  luck.  This  possibility  suggests   that
responsibility  for  holding  the  taste  does  not  matter  in  the  absence  of  responsibility   for   its
expensiveness.
For this reason Cohen now makes it clear that it is responsibility for  the  expensiveness  of
one’s taste that matters.[9] People are entitled to compensation on this  account  where  they  have
what Dworkin describes as bad price luck, ‘which is bad luck in the high  cost  of  the  preferences
they have’.[10] This would be a relevant set of facts on such an account:
6. (a) At t a steak cost £2.
(b) At t a hamburger cost £2.
(c) Steve could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate the rise in price of steaks from
t to the present.
            Cohen believes that it would  be  unfair  to  penalize  Steve  for  the  unforeseen  economic
changes that have replaced  the  favourable  circumstances  depicted  in  6  with  the  unfavourable
circumstances depicted in 3. No transfer would be due if Steve knew such changes were  likely  to
occur but gambled that  they  would  not,  or  hoped  that  they  would,  maybe  because  he  views
expense as itself desirable.[11] But this is not the case here. As it is, Steve suffers from  a  welfare
deficit for which  he  is  not  relevantly  responsible;  such  deficits  are  compensable  on  Cohen’s
scheme, and the first element of the reformulation of his flagship statement reflects that.
III. Brute Taste and Judgmental Taste
The second sentence of Cohen’s original flagship statement reads thus:
There are those [tastes] which he [an  individual]  could  not  have  helped  forming  and/or
could not now unform, and then there are  those  for  which,  by  contrast,  he  can  be  held
responsible, because he could have forestalled them and/or because he could  now  unlearn
them.[12]
Cohen believes that the failings of this second sentence are more substantial than those of the first.
The problem is not merely that his  position  is  poorly  expressed:  the  position  itself  is  at  fault.
While Cohen still believes that some chosen tastes are non-compensable,  he  now  maintains  that
others do give rise to valid claims for compensation. The former category are brute tastes,  ‘which
do not embody judgments of valuation’.[13] Cohen offers the example of ‘my own liking for  Diet
Coke, which embodies no  particular  approval  of  it’.[14]  Judgmental  tastes,  by  contrast,  ‘are
informed by valuational judgment’. Cohen explains his change of stance as follows:
I no longer think that the mere fact that people chose to develop and/or  could  now  school
themselves out of an expensive judgmental taste means that they should pick up the tab for
it, and that is precisely because  they  did  and  do  identify  with  it,  and  therefore  cannot
reasonably be expected to have not developed it or to rid themselves of it.[15]
The moral idea driving the distributive proposal is that some persons  are  disadvantaged  by  their
identification with certain tastes which turn out  to  be  expensive,  since  that  identification  leads
them to develop those tastes. Cohen observes that this takes his position  even  further  away  from
Dworkin’s:
So  what  Dworkin  gives  as  a  reason  for  withholding   compensation   –   the   subjects’
approving identification with their expensive tastes – is something that I regard as a reason
for offering it, since, where identification is present, it is, standardly, the agents’  very  bad
luck that a preference with which they strongly identify happens  to  be  expensive,  and  to
expect them to forego or to restrict satisfaction of that preference (because it is  expensive)
is, therefore, to ask them to accept an alienation from what is deep in them.[16]
Cohen’s move should not exactly be to turn  Dworkin  on  his  head.  One  may  recall  that
Dworkin is interested in the presence or absence of identification with taste right  now:  hence,  on
his account, fact 4 in the hamburger-and-steak case mentioned at the outset justifies compensation
for Steve (given fact 1). Here Cohen, like Dworkin, focuses on  present  (dis)identification:  unfair
disadvantage arises ‘where identification is present’. However, we have seen that elsewhere in the
same paper he focuses on the history of identification as well: persons who did identify or who  do
identify  with  a  taste  ‘…  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  have  not  developed  it  or  to  rid
themselves of it’. In other words, present (dis)identification matters for establishing  whether  it  is
reasonable to expect an expensive taste to be unlearned, while past  (dis)identification  matters  for
the key issue of establishing whether it is reasonable to hold someone accountable for their choice
to develop a taste.
So why should Cohen maintain that history of identification matters? An  answer  becomes
clear when we consider the case of someone who initially had no identification with an  expensive
taste, but nevertheless developed it,  and  subsequently  came  to  identify  with  it.  Cohen  has  no
reason for thinking that it would be unreasonable to ask such  a  person  to  bear  the  cost  of  their
taste whether they can now be rid of it or not, for that cost has arisen directly  from  a  choice  that
she was not predisposed to make. It is a history of identification that  excuses  an  individual  from
bearing the cost of their expensive taste; present identification only tells us that an individual  who
has been so excused cannot be expected to dispose of their taste.
IV. Chosen Expensive Brute Taste
The discussion of the previous section indicates that the  following  would  be  an  example  of  an
additional relevant fact on Cohen’s scheme:
7. Prior to and at t, Steve disidentified with the taste he then had and identified with the  taste
he now has.
This embodies my stipulation, given  as  an  interpretation  of  Cohen,  that  the  (dis)identification
must   not   come   after   the   possession   of   the   taste   –   it   must   be   what   we   might   call
pre(dis)identification. According to Cohen, the presence of this  fact  diminishes  Steve’s  liability
for his present expensive taste. It shows that, even if Steve is responsible for the fact that the  taste
he holds is expensive, it would be unreasonable to make him bear its cost.[17]
The implications of this revised account are no simple matter. To see them  one  must  first
try and establish what exactly a chosen expensive brute taste might look like. This is because  they
are (with one important exception to be mentioned in section VI) the only kind of  expensive  taste
that Cohen now refuses to provide  compensation  for,  and  as  such  they  appear  to  be  the  only
source of disagreement between Cohen and equality of welfare. I  will  maintain  that,  from  what
little Cohen says about chosen brute taste, it  is  not  clear  that  they  can  exist  in  a  form  that  is
differentiated from chosen judgmental taste by any morally significant  characteristic.  On  one  of
the two available interpretations, Cohen’s account amounts to  no  more  or  less  than  equality  of
welfare,[18] insofar as it is concerned with welfare;[19]  on  the  other,  it  amounts  to  something
with (even) less justification.
The  feature  that  makes  a  taste  brute  in  Cohen’s  sense  is  that  it  ‘does   not   embody
judgments of valuation’. For reasons that should be obvious from the earlier  discussion,  the  kind
of judgments of valuation that they do not embody are those that are temporally prior to  the  taste
itself. Steve’s taste for steak does not go from being judgmental to being brute simply  because  he
stops identifying with it some time after he has acquired it, for Cohen’s question of whether  Steve
could reasonably have been expected to turn down the opportunity to cultivate that taste, given the
cost that would impose upon him, can obviously only apply before taste acquisition.  The  kind  of
taste we are looking for is one that is chosen and initially not supported by value judgments.
            How might the origins of Cohen’s own taste for  Diet  Coke  meet  both  of  these  criteria?
Were Jerry (as I will call this character) brought up to have this taste or hypnotized into having  it,
it would fail to meet the criterion of being chosen.[20] This would also be the case if  his  first  sip
had  him  hooked,  and  that  sip  resulted  from,  say,  a  bartending  error  or  lack   of   alternative
beverages. Contrariwise, if Jerry made a deliberate attempt to cultivate that taste  it  would  fail  to
meet the non-judgmental criterion. That attempt must be based on some kind  of  value  judgment,
however sensible or fatuous it may be, for otherwise his behaviour is inexplicable.
There are further possibilities that may appear to salvage chosen brute taste. First,  suppose
that  Jerry  makes  no  deliberate  attempt   to   cultivate   a   taste   for   Diet   Coke   and   has   no
preidentification with it, but that he tries it anyway. Perhaps he  just  wants  to  see  what  it  tastes
like. Or maybe he has decided to live his life as a ‘free spirit’, which right now means trying some
Diet Coke for no particular reason. Either way, Jerry’s first sip results in taste formation.
For the moment, let us grant  that  the  taste  that  is  formed  in  a  case  like  this  is  brute.
Although  preidentification  with  taste  is  absent,  other  kinds  of  relevant  value  judgments  are
present. It seems to me that Jerry could only have not taken  his  sip  by  acting  in  a  fashion  that
contradicted his value judgment that he ought to find out what Diet  Coke  tastes  like,  or  that  he
ought to drink it just because that’s what he wants to do. Such contradiction is not directly  related
to taste. It is, however, obviously an incident of self-infliction of cost. Were  it  identical  in  every
regard except the structure of its relation to taste, Cohen would say that it could not reasonably  be
expected of Jerry. If this kind of self-infliction is unreasonable where  the  judgment  endorses  the
taste I do not see any reason why it is less unreasonable where the  judgment  endorses  something
else that can only be realized by performing an action that may or  will  result  in  taste  formation.
There is a slight causal  difference  but  no  moral  difference:  in  both  types  of  case  we  require
individuals ‘to accept an alienation from what is deep in them’ if they are not  to  suffer  a  welfare
deficit. On this natural reading of Cohen, he appears to base compensation on a  morally  arbitrary
distinction.
V. An Alternative Interpretation
Suppose, then, that we take a more liberal reading. Here we describe a taste such as Jerry’s  –  one
that is not preidentified with,  but  that  could  only  have  been  avoided  at  the  cost  of  violating
otherwise  independent  value  judgments  –   as   an   indirect   judgmental   taste.   The   resulting
broad  sense  of  judgmental  taste,  encompassing  both   indirect   judgmental   taste   and   direct
judgmental taste (instances of which are preidentified with), is somewhat  strained  as  a  construal
of  Cohen,  given  that  it  includes  ‘taste  that  does  not  track  a  judgment  of  the  value   of   its
object’.[21]  But  it  –  and  the  corresponding  narrow  construal  of  brute  taste  –  sits  far  more
comfortably with Cohen’s moral argument that it is unreasonable to expect  persons  to  contradict
their  value  judgments.  In  this  case  it  looks  like  there   is   nothing   morally   arbitrary   about
compensating for chosen judgmental taste but not for chosen brute taste. But the  revised  position
also radically limits the occurrence of chosen brute taste (that is,  a  chosen  taste  that  could  have
been avoided at no  self-inflicted  cost).  Usually  a  taste  must  be  either  unchosen  or  endorsed,
somewhere along the line, by valuational judgment; in the odd case where  it  is  both  unendorsed
and, in some sense, chosen, compensation is still appropriate.
             This  is  shown  in  two  more  kinds  of  cases.  We  might  suppose   that   Jerry   has   no
preidentification with Diet Coke but that he is a  ‘diceman’  –  one  who  makes  his  choices  in  a
random fashion – and, when ordering his drinks,  Diet  Coke’s  number  comes  up.  Or  we  might
suppose that, while Jerry’s action might look like it could be explained as  either  experimental  or
wilfully random, he is simply acting on impulse. In each case we again suppose  that  the  first  sip
results in taste formation.
When presented with cases like Diceman Jerry it is tempting to  think  that  chosen  narrow
brute taste might ride in on the back of  uncertainty  about  outcomes.  The  unexpected  results  of
random but deliberate action may appear to be chosen without there having been  any  question  of
identification. It is therefore important to note that the actual likelihood of  the  taste  arising  from
the action, and the individual’s perception of this likelihood, are quite irrelevant to the question  of
whether the taste is (indirectly) judgmental. All that matters is that the individual  could  not  have
performed otherwise without contradicting his own judgment. Even if the individual thought there
was no possibility of taste formation, and it was in fact a million to one shot,  that  taste  would  be
fully judgmental on account of the clear causal link between it, the action, and the endorsement  of
the action.
Both this point  and  the  more  general  point  about  the  infrequency  with  which  chosen
narrow brute taste can occur is illustrated well in the Diceman Jerry case. Diceman Jerry’s taste is,
I will allow, chosen and not itself preidentified with. But the endorsement of running one’s life  on
the roll of a dice is clearly a value judgment. That preidentification  with  randomizing  is,  in  this
instance, bound up with the taste. Even though the  link  between  Diceman  Jerry’s  taste  and  his
judgment is indirect and fortuitous, his taste is judgmental, for he could have  declined  the  option
of drinking Diet Coke only by alienating himself from his own judgment. This causal  relationship
is all that is required to show that the taste is not brute in the narrow sense.
The final, impulsive case faces the initial worry that no taste formed in this  way  could  be
chosen. But I am willing to grant, for the sake of argument, that choice may be present  here.  This
issue aside, impulsive action appears to present the best opportunity for  non-compensable  chosen
brute taste to arise. Even so, Jerry’s behaviour is presumably explainable in one of two  ways,  and
neither of these will do. Firstly, there may be a value  judgment  even  further  back  in  the  causal
chain than in the earlier  two  cases.  This  judgment  may  direct  Jerry  to  act  spontaneously  and
without regard to consequences. This case is not relevantly different from that of  the  self-defined
free spirit. As before, the taste can be treated as non-compensable only  if  we  demand  that  Jerry
alienate himself from his judgment. On the alternative reading of Cohen,  the  taste  is,  again,  not
brute. Secondly, and more interestingly, Jerry may be following  no  value  judgment  whatsoever.
He may by nature be an extremely impetuous person. It  may  have  never  crossed  his  mind  that
acting in a more considered way is a viable option. This is the one kind  of  case  where  the  more
liberal reading of Cohen can, like the more straightforward construal,  identify  chosen  brute  (i.e.
unendorsed) taste. But the common denial of compensation in both instances is morally  arbitrary.
If it is unreasonable to expect someone to act against their valuational judgment, it is, if  anything,
more unreasonable to expect someone to act against their natural temperament, where  no  reasons
for  such  behavioural  modification  have  even   been   entertained.   The   complete   absence   of
valuational judgment makes it inappropriate to punish (or reward) in this case as one might were a
full moral agent involved. Even if we allow that there is choice, there is not responsibility.[22]
VI. Costlessly Removable Expensive Taste
The basic problem we have so far  encountered  is  that  one  can  generally  choose  to  undergo  a
course of action that may inadvertently result in the acquisition of  a  taste  only  where  one  holds
value  judgments  that  recommend  that  course  of  action.  A  taste  of  this  kind  is  an   indirect
judgmental taste. One can only avoid this conclusion by failing to acknowledge the  cost  involved
in acting contrary to value judgments that are only indirectly linked to the acquisition of  the  taste
(for example, ones recommending ‘taste testing’ or  spontaneity).  This  is  precisely  what  Cohen
does on the more natural reading mentioned above. But I can see no moral justification for such  a
position. Indeed, it seems to run counter to the  unreasonableness-of-expecting-self-imposed-costs
justification that Cohen attempts to support his stance with. If, on the  other  hand,  we  work  with
the more liberally interpreted senses of brute and judgmental taste, chosen brute taste can  only  be
held by the very impulsive. So interpreted, Cohen’s position is either, again, morally  arbitrary  (if
we  penalize  purely  impulsive  behaviour)  or  virtually  normatively  identical  with  equality   of
welfare. In the latter case, it makes conceptual distinctions (between  brute  and  judgmental  taste,
and  between  chosen  and  unchosen  taste)  that  equality  of  welfare   does   not,   but   the   only
normatively relevant combination is all but impossible since  non-purely  impulsive  chosen  brute
tastes are reclassified as indirect judgmental tastes. 
I say ‘all but impossible’ as there is one special case where it may appear that Cohen could
still reasonably deny compensation for expensive taste. This is  the  case  of  costlessly  removable
expensive taste. Whether it was initially chosen or not, Cohen denies compensation  for  expensive
tastes that can be removed at no expense – which is to say not only that the tastes are not presently
identified with, but also that there are  no  ‘incidental’  costs  that  are  unrelated  to  identification.
Equality of welfare would even compensate in  the  case  where  an  individual  with  such  a  taste
obstinately refused to remove it.
The absence of present identification marks  these  tastes  as  brute  in  the  sense  that  was
rejected in section III above. The absence of incidental costs is much the more  demanding  of  the
two requirements mentioned in the previous paragraph. Even where a  taste  is  disidentified  with,
there will almost always be some financial expenditure, lost time or other inconvenience  involved
in schooling oneself out of it that results  in  a  welfare  loss.  As  costlessly  removable  expensive
tastes are little more than a possibility, the space  between  the  broad  judgmental  taste  view  and
equality of welfare is barely a sliver.
Yet the rarity of costlessly removable expensive tastes is  not  the  most  substantial  bar  to
their serving as an effective prop for Cohen’s position. The refusal to compensate for  these  tastes
is morally suspect for reasons that  are  very  much  parallel  to  those  that  applied  to  the  natural
reading  of  Cohen  (where  judgmental  taste  was  narrowly  construed).  A  deliberate  failure  to
remove a taste,  even  where  there  is  no  cost  involved,  presumably  itself  involves  valuational
judgment. We might again ask why it is  unreasonable  to  ask  people  to  act  against  their  value
judgments in some cases, but not in others.
Someone  endorsing  compensation  for  judgmental  taste   in   either   the   narrow   sense
(admitting  direct  judgmental  tastes  only)  or  broad  sense  (admitting  both  direct  and  indirect
judgmental tastes) faces an unpalatable choice. They could treat the value  judgments  that  oppose
costless removal of expensive tastes as the basis for compensation for those tastes (either  because
the judgments are necessarily tied up with judgmental taste or for  independent  reasons).  Or  they
could refuse compensation, in which case their moral consistency is in  doubt,  given  the  original
justification for compensation for expensive judgmental tastes.
VII. Biting the Bullet
The argument that expensive judgmental taste should not be penalized has some intuitive  support.
But consistent endorsement of what appears to be its key premise –  that  it  is  wrong  to  penalize
persons for choices that are required by their valuational judgment – commits Cohen to more  than
he  acknowledges.  For  the  premise  to  be  consistently  endorsed,  both  the  broad  construal  of
judgmental taste and compensation for costlessly removable expensive tastes that are not removed
is  required.  This  treatment  of  tastes  is  identical  to  that  of  equality  of  welfare,  even  if   the
justification is different.[23]
It appears that Cohen is still determined to put distance between his  account  and  equality
of welfare.[24] If the arguments presented above have helped to clarify  the  size  of  that  distance
and, in particular, the normative difficulties that are involved in retaining it, they would  for  those
reasons alone have some significance. But what if Cohen, or someone endorsing similar premises,
were to bite the bullet, and accept that something very close to equality  of  welfare  is  the  correct
account of egalitarian justice after all?
This move faces the arguments against equality of welfare  presented  by  Dworkin,  which
could be applied to the new position with minimal revision. The objection to social  allowance  for
expensive tastes is of course foremost  amongst  these.  One  question,  then,  is  whether  Cohen’s
focus on the (alleged) wrongness of penalizing acts required by  valuational  judgment  suggests  a
new  way  around  the  objection.  It  seems  quite  clear  that  it  does  not.  In  Dworkin’s  original
presentation, ‘someone (Louis) sets out deliberately to cultivate some  taste  or  ambition  he  does
not now have’, for the specific purpose of ‘trying to make his life a better life  in  some  way’.[25]
So it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that,  from  the  outset,  Louis  is  characterized  as  acting  on
valuational judgment. But Dworkin thinks that of no help to his cause:
This does not make his  claim  for  extra  resources  any  more  appealing  or  less  counter-
intuitive … . On the contrary, the fact that he is acting so deliberately in his  own  interests
seems to make his claim, if anything, less appealing than the claim of  someone  who  tries
an expensive experience on a whim, for the pleasure of the moment, and then finds that  he
is hooked.[26]
Whether one agrees with Dworkin’s position or not is unlikely to be affected  by  Cohen’s  change
of emphasis. As Cohen acknowledges, Dworkin always accounted for valuational  judgment  –  he
just did not think it mattered. Takers of the bullet-biting strategy are squarely in Dworkin’s sights.
VIII. Valuational Judgment as Responsibility-Diminishing
It seems to me that there may be a less hazardous way of endorsing the  premise  that  it  is  wrong
for  persons  to  be  disadvantaged  by  valuational  judgment-endorsed  acts.  On   one   prominent
construal  of  equality  of  opportunity  for  welfare,  which  Cohen  has  consistently  endorsed,   a
disadvantage  such  as  an  expensive  taste   is   non-compensable   only   where   the   holder   has
genuinely chosen it – that is, where she is responsible for it in a deep,  metaphysically  valid  way.
The appropriate distribution is dependent on both which account of free  will  and  determinism  is
correct and facts particular to each case.[27] The presence or  absence  of  preidentification,  or  of
other, less direct value judgments that have resulted in taste formation (such as those of Dicemen),
are  candidates  for  relevant  particular  facts.  It  might  be  thought  that,  although  a  history   of
valuational judgment is not  grounds  for  assuming  full  non-responsibility,  it  may  diminish  an
individual’s responsibility for developing their taste. As the strength of the value judgments –  and
the degrees of difficulty and pain involved in acting contrary to them – increase,  so  responsibility
decreases. We might, then, hold that Cohen’s discomfort with the position he  took  in  ‘Currency’
is based on a failure to appreciate the full range of considerations that responsibility may take  into
account. The complaint is really with certain prevalent conceptions  of  responsibility  and  related
concepts, such as choice, which fail to recognize the significant role of valuational judgment. That
a person is acting on valuational judgment is not typically taken to be a  factor  in  favour  of  their
case for compensation – Dworkin for one thinks quite the opposite. Once  the  argument  shifts  to
this level there appears to be little problem with the position Cohen took in  ‘Currency’.  One  gets
the outcome of compensating for valuational judgment-based  tastes  by  combining  conventional
equality of opportunity for welfare with a particular account of responsibility.
Now it might be asked why this strategy should be preferred to the  bullet-biting  one.  The
answer is twofold. First is the way it accounts for the moral significance of variations  in  the  ease
with which preidentification and other relevant judgments can be contradicted. In some  cases,  an
individual  may  only  act  against  their   valuational   judgment   at   cost   of   considerable   self-
contradiction, but in others, while there is some cost involved, it is relatively minor. An agent who
acts against their preidentification  with  an  expensive  taste  for  the  theatre  might  consequently
experience great inner-anguish or hardly anything at all – it just depends  on  the  character  of  the
preidentification. In light of this, the strategy suggested by the alternative reading of Cohen, under
which full compensation is to be provided in  each  case  of  valuational  judgment-based  taste,  is
insufficiently discriminating.
A possible retort here is this: why not just adopt a further interpretation – or really, by  this
point, reinterpretation – of Cohen, such that his position admits of  degrees.  The  more  promising
version of this approach works  with  the  alternative  reading  of  Cohen’s  position,  avoiding  the
moral arbitrariness of the natural interpretation, but placing all tastes somewhere  on  a  continuum
of valuational judgment strength. On other words, we accept that all tastes are  judgmental  (broad
sense), but hold that those tastes whose cultivation could only have been avoided at great personal
cost give entitlements to higher levels of compensation than those  whose  cultivation  could  have
been avoided at a smaller price. This is certainly not the position that Cohen  takes,  and  not  only
because it relies on the alternative reading of Cohen. For Cohen also does not seem to consider the
possibility of morally relevant variations in the strength of identification; indeed, his discussion of
(direct) judgmental taste seems just to assume that  there  is  strong  identification.  But  it  does  at
least retain Cohen’s identification of valuational judgment and non-responsibility  as  two  distinct
grounds for compensation.
There is, however, an additional argument for a subsumption of the first  of  these  grounds
under the second which points to a weakness common to both  the  bullet-biting  strategy  and  the
‘sliding scale’ view of broad judgmental tastes. The argument is that both positions give  hostages
to fortune, in the sense that (direct  or  indirect)  taste-creating  value  judgments  are  specified  as
grounds for compensation, be  it  full  or  partial,  regardless  of  which  account  of  responsibility
happens to  be  correct.  I  do  not  see  any  reason  for  thinking  that,  whatever  expensive  taste-
excusing properties valuational judgment has, they are independent  of  responsibility.  If  we  take
the  most  straightforward  case,  that  of  direct  judgmental  taste,  I  submit  that  the  appropriate
response to a particular instance of preidentification is very likely to depend on questions  such  as
these: What is the causal history of the  preidentification?  Was  the  agent  aware  of  the  costs  of
acting  as  suggested  by  the  preidentification?  How  do  other  agents   with   similar   levels   of
preidentification and information act?  Which  general  account  of  free  will  and  determinism  is
correct? On this account, can acts based on preidentification be genuinely voluntary, or not?  Does
this account, combined with  an  account  of  egalitarian  justice,  allow  that  some  acts  based  on
preidentification are compensable? If so, which  acts,  and  how  much  compensation?  These  are
questions of responsibility. I do not see how we can detach the moral significance of taste-creating
value judgments from them, far less  assume  an  overwhelming  moral  significance  however  we
answer them.
IX. Concluding Remarks
The argument of this article suggests that egalitarians looking to occupy a  position  on  expensive
taste that falls between conventional equality of opportunity for  welfare  and  equality  of  welfare
cannot  expect  the  brute  taste/judgmental   taste   distinction   to   carry   the   justificatory   load.
Nevertheless, the distinction serves a valuable role, in highlighting the possibility  that  egalitarian
justice,  especially  as  depicted  by  Dworkin,  treats  the  bearers  of  valuational  judgment-based
expensive tastes in unduly harsh fashion. I hope to have shown that the corrective to  this  state  of
affairs need not be at the  level  of  distributive  principle,  as  Cohen  proposes,  since  the  role  of
valuational judgment in taste formation might be accounted for  by  the  account  of  responsibility
that is utilized by distributive principles. This underlines the importance  for  political  philosophy
of the contents of what Susan Hurley calls  the  ‘black  box  of  responsibility’.[28]  The  problems
with the notion of compensating for valuational judgment-based acts  reinforces  Hurley’s  general
contention that different accounts of  responsibility  have  differing  implications  for  accounts  of
distributive justice. If, as is fairly likely, valuational judgment bears  on  responsibility,  and  takes
much (if not all) of its moral significance from that connection,  it  is  a  mistake  to  decide  on  its
weight in distributive decisions quite independently of responsibility considerations. Interestingly,
this is one case where a ‘luck  egalitarian’  –  or  more  specifically,  ‘thin  luck  egalitarian’[29]  –
position may actually be reinforced by filling in the details  of  responsibility,  since  the  non-luck
egalitarian addition (compensation for judgmental taste) to a luck egalitarian position (equality  of
opportunity for welfare) may thereby be shown to be otiose.
It    might    be    objected    that    the     conventional-equality-of-opportunity-for-welfare-
plus-valuational-judgment-sensitive-account-of-responsibility strategy defended in  the  preceding
two  sections  gives  a  hostage  to  fortune  which,  while  different  from  that   of   the   Cohenian
alternatives,  is  no  less  problematic.  This  is   its   commitment   that   valuational   judgment   is
necessarily a condition – or even, on the strongest version of the view, the sole condition – for non-
responsibility. The objection is sound. Even so, to me this seems like  the  most  plausible  way  of
ensuring  compensation  for  expensive   taste-creating   value   judgments,   for   reasons   already
mentioned. Since I am unconvinced that such compensation is demanded  by  justice  (although  it
may well be) I would prefer to leave the  question  of  exactly  what  responsibility  is  as  open  as
possible. Of course, in doing this, I face the further objection that I am myself  trying  to  keep  the
lid on the black box  of  responsibility.  In  reply,  I  would  point  out  that  there  seems  to  be  no
structural  deficiency  or  superfluity  with  the  thin  luck  egalitarian  position  that,   like   special
compensation for valuational judgment-based expensive taste, would be exposed  as  such  once  a
full account of responsibility was provided. It is  quite  compatible  with  responsibility,  whatever
role the latter gives to valuational judgment. I am not so much keeping the lid on the black box  of
responsibility as refusing to prejudge its contents.
The strategy I propose replies to the Dworkinian expensive taste objection in just  the  way
that Cohen intended  in  ‘Currency’,  arguing  that,  regardless  of  whether  an  expensive  taste  is
presently identified with, compensation seems reasonable where the holder is  not  responsible  for
the expense of her taste. We allow for the  possibility  that  a  history  of  valuational  judgment  is
responsibility-diminishing,  but  we  do  not  insist  that  it  is  a  responsibility-diminishing  factor,
irrespective of what else there is to know about responsibility, nor (as the bullet-biting and  sliding
scale Cohen-derived positions suggest) that it is  a  compensation-entitling  factor,  irrespective  of
whether  it  diminishes  responsibility.   This   is   the   right   tack   to   take   in   the   absence   of
overwhelmingly strong arguments for the distributive significance of valuational judgment.
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